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 Abstract 
The paper analyses the course of Dutch financial policy since the demise of Keynesian 
full employment. How did the public expenditure ratio, the tax burden, and the defi-
cit develop in the last twenty-five years? Why did the government lose control over 
public spending in the period between 1977 and 1982, even though it proved possible 
to reduce spending continuously thereafter? Important explanatory variables in this 
context are economic growth and the ideological orientation of the government. In 
the 1990s, however, a literature on the common pool resource problem of public 
budgets developed which emphasizes the impact of the number of actors involved in 
financial policy-making as well as the institutional design of the budget process for 
public spending. Combining process tracing and intertemporal comparison, the study 
demonstrates how fiscal contracts were made and how they were stabilized through 
the working of the party system. It concludes that if other relevant variables are al-
lowed for, fiscal contracts did have a moderating impact on public spending. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
In dem Papier wird die Finanzpolitik der Niederlande seit dem Ende der keynesiani-
schen Vollbeschäftigungsphase analysiert. Wie haben sich die Staatsquote, die Abga-
benquote und das Defizit in den vergangenen 25 Jahren entwickelt? Warum sind die 
Staatsausgaben in der Phase von 1977 bis 1982 praktisch unkontrolliert gewachsen, 
wenn es danach gelang, diese kontinuierlich zurück zu führen? Wichtige Erklärungs-
variablen sind in diesem Zusammenhang natürlich das Wirtschaftswachstum und die 
ideologische Ausrichtung der Regierung. In den Neunzigerjahren hat sich eine Litera-
tur zum Allmendeproblem des öffentlichen Haushaltes entwickelt, die zur Erklärung 
der Entwicklung der Staatsausgaben vor allem auf die Zahl der finanzpolitischen Ak-
teure und die institutionelle Ausgestaltung des Haushaltsprozesses abstellt. Durch eine 
Kombination von Prozessanalyse und intertemporalen Vergleich wird gezeigt, wie 
finanzpolitische Vereinbarungen zu Stande kamen und wie sie durch die Funktions-
weise des Parteiensystems stabilisiert wurden. Schließlich wird belegt, dass die in Koa-
litionsabkommen niedergelegten finanzpolitischen Absprachen unter Kontrolle ande-
rer wichtiger Erklärungsvariablen einen mäßigenden Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der 
Staatsquote hatten. 
4 MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/2 
Contents 
1 Introduction 5 
2 The fiscal performance of the Netherlands 1977–2002 6 
3 The CPR approach and some methodological remarks 8 
4 Analytical framework 11 
5 The parliamentary system of the Netherlands 13 
6 The financial policy of the Van Agt, Lubbers and Kok governments 20 
7 Conclusion 28 
References  31 
Seils: Financial Policy in the Netherlands 5 
1 Introduction 
In the post-war period, Keynesian fiscal policy stabilized full employment. In return, 
increasing wages made for a steady flow of taxes that sufficed to fund the growing 
Keynesian welfare state. This equilibrium disintegrated in the mid-seventies. The 
Netherlands – like many other industrial nations – began to suffer from structural 
unemployment that could not successfully be dealt with by Keynesian policies alone. 
As a consequence public outlays and deficits increased. At the same time a paradig-
matic shift occurred in academic economics. New theories recommended public ex-
penditure restraint. How did Dutch financial policy respond to these intellectual and 
economic challenges? 
                                                        
I am heavily indebted to the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne and in par-
ticular to director emeritus Fritz W. Scharpf for generous support. Furthermore, I have to thank 
the participants of a seminar at the MPIfG and Hendrik Zorn for sharing his data. It would have 
been impossible to finish this paper without the support of the Department of Political Science, 
University of Cologne. Final drafts of the paper benefited greatly from comments by André Kaiser 
and the untiring work of our research assistants. Siebo Jansen helped me with useful information 
on Belgium. Finally, I would like to thank the two referees Imke Kruse and Philip Manow for their 
useful suggestions and Cynthia Lehmann for help with the English language. 
In the adjustment process two distinctive periods can be distinguished: In the first 
period up to the early 1980s public outlays, taxes and deficits clearly got out of con-
trol. The years 1982/83 brought a trend reversal. In the following two decades public 
expenditures decreased rapidly. Today, the share of public spending in GDP is lower 
than in 1977, the budget is structurally consolidated, and full employment has been at 
least temporarily regained. Why is it that public finances went out of control in the 
late 1970s? And why did budget consolidation prove to be possible thereafter? 
In the 1990s a literature arose that tries to explain financial policy outcomes with ref-
erence to the common pool resource (CPR) problem of public budgets. According to 
this school of thought, public expenditures will increase unduly unless access to the 
budget is restricted by an effective fiscal contract or hierarchical institutions such as a 
strong minister of finance. Research with this approach has produced substantial in-
sights with an important impact on the real world. However, some problems are still 
unresolved: First, there are few studies which show how co-operation can evolve un-
der the conditions of the commons problem. Second, how can these fiscal agreements 
be stabilized? Third, in spite of numerous regression analyses there is currently no 
agreement about the effects of budget institutions. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold: First, I want to shed some light on the empirical 
puzzle of the Dutch public expenditure ratio. Second, I think that this analysis will 
yield some answers to the problems in the literature. With regard to the development 
of the public expenditure ratio I will argue that it cannot be explained by economic 
factors alone. Instead we have to take the role of the CPR problem and fiscal contracts 
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into account. During the first period (1977–82) public expenditures soared because 
there was no fiscal contract to contain the commons problem. By contrast, all gov-
ernments during the second period (1983–2002) concluded fiscal agreements during 
coalition formation. Hence, various ministers of finance managed to keep the CPR 
problem at bay and eventually reduced the public expenditure ratio. 
With reference to the problems in the literature I will advance the following hypothe-
ses: First, it is easier to negotiate a fiscal contract if the “distributional dimension” 
(Who gets what?) of the CPR problem is separated from the production dimension 
(How much aggregate spending?). Second, the Dutch party system stabilizes these 
contracts as long as the chance to participate in government does not primarily de-
pend on votes but on the relationship between the parties. Third, fiscal contracts have 
a moderating effect on public spending if one controls for economic growth and the 
actor constellation. The paper has six sections: First, I describe the development of the 
public expenditure ratio in the Netherlands, i.e. the dependent variable. Second, I 
review the literature using the CPR approach and identify some of its problems. 
Third, I present my analytical framework, which is based on elements from Scharpf’s 
actor-centered institutionalism and the CPR approach. The fourth section settles the 
questions of whether the CPR problem is prevalent in the Dutch parliamentary system 
and whether the institutional framework can offer a solution. In the fifth section I 
employ my analytical framework to analyze Dutch fiscal policy, and finally I draw 
conclusions. 
2 The fiscal performance of the Netherlands 1977–2002 
How did Dutch public expenditure and revenues develop during the successive gov-
ernment terms between 1977 and 2002? Figure 1 shows public outlays and revenues as 
a share of gross domestic product for the Netherlands and the average of 14 OECD 
countries. The difference between outlays and revenues equals the deficit or surplus in 
that particular year. The reader should note that the average only serves as a bench-
mark against which Dutch fiscal performance can be judged. It does not imply that 
this paper aims to explain the variance in fiscal performance between the Netherlands 
and the benchmark since this would require a much larger study. It includes wealthy 
parliamentary democracies only.1 
 
                                                        
1 The countries included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Great 
Britain, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden. Finland, France, 
and Switzerland are excluded because they are often classified as semi-presidential or non-
parliamentary forms of government. The conclusions from the comparisons are, however, 
quite robust and do not depend on the inclusion or exclusion of one or two countries. 
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What is striking is the sharp increase in public expenditures during the Van Agt gov-
ernments. In fact, the share of public outlays in GDP increased by almost ten percent-
age points in only five years. The increase, which was mainly financed through defi-
cits, is more pronounced than in other comparable nations at the time. In just three 
years, from 1978 to 1980, the public expenditure ratio went up by 5.8 percentage 
points. During the transition to the first Lubbers government, however, a trend rever-
sal emerges. The share of public outlays in GDP starts to decrease even faster than in 
other parliamentary democracies. In the three years between 1988 and 1990 the public 
expenditure ratio fell by 3.9 percentage points. Even during the recession of the early 
nineties when outlays rose quickly in other parliamentary democracies, the public 
expenditure ratio in the Netherlands remained almost stable. In fact, the increase in 
the three-year period between 1991 and 1993 was limited to only half a percentage 
point. During Wim Kok’s terms of office, public outlays decreased further. In the 
years between 1996 and 1998 the ratio of public expenditures to national product 
dropped by 4.3 percentage points. This was even faster than in the second half of the 
eighties. During the second Kok government we can even observe budget surpluses 
due to the fact that the tax burden decreased slower than outlays. In the current reces-
sion the surpluses have vanished again. From this brief sketch of Dutch fiscal per-
formance the empirical puzzle of this paper arises: Why is it that public expenditures 
went out of control during the Van Agt governments? And why was it possible to cut 
spending during the Lubbers and Kok governments? In the following section, I will 
review the literature which applies the CPR approach to public budgeting. 
Figure 1
Public outlays and revenues
Note: Caretaker governments are treated as part of their predecessors.
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3 The CPR approach and some methodological remarks 
The common pool resource (CPR) approach took hold in the political-economic lit-
erature after the path breaking studies by Roubini and Sachs (Roubini/Sachs 1989a, 
1989b) and von Hagen (von Hagen 1992; von Hagen/Harden 1994). It is based on the 
simple idea that public benefits are concentrated on certain constituencies while the 
costs of public policies have to be borne by all taxpayers. This means that the price in 
terms of taxation actually paid by the user is much lower than the “production costs” 
of the benefit. Hence, demand will also be higher in comparison to a situation where 
the user has to pay the full costs. Without a fiscal contract or hierarchical institutions 
such as a strong minister of finance, outlays will soon consist of the sum of individual 
claims. Thus, under such conditions public spending and the associated taxes and 
deficits are always higher than can be reconciled with common welfare. 
The CPR approach has inspired a vast amount of empirical research that tries to esti-
mate the effects of political, institutional and economic variables on the development 
of deficits, public debt, and government outlays (Borelli/Royed 1995; De Haan/
Sturm 1997; De Haan/Sturm/Beekhuis 1999; Kontopoulos/Perotti 1999; Volkerink 
1999; Volkerink/de Haan 2001). Most of these studies apply regression analysis to 
cross-national time-series. This methodology has several obvious advantages: First, 
researchers can quantify the effects of factors such as the number of actors involved in 
the budget process and the impact of various institutional designs on budgetary out-
comes. At the same time, they can control for a large number of intervening variables. 
Second, in contrast to case studies, statistical analysis is supposed to yield generaliz-
able results. In fact, research in this tradition has produced substantial results with 
important impact on the real world. The Swedish government, for example, has rede-
signed its budget process as a reaction to the findings of von Hagen (Molander 2000). 
In spite of these successes, there are still some blind spots and unresolved problems in 
the literature.2 First, there are no studies which show how co-operation can evolve 
under the conditions of the commons problem. This is far from trivial, given that the 
actors are caught in the “negotiator’s dilemma” (Scharpf 1997: 124), i.e. they have to 
solve a “production problem” (Which level of spending is in accordance with the 
common good?) and a “distributional problem” (Who gets what?) at the same time. 
The answer to the “production problem” requires creativity, co-operation and trust 
between actors. By contrast, successful actors in the distributional struggle have to be 
opportunistic. In real-world situations these two dimensions can hardly be separated. 
Arguments about a collectively optimal level of spending, for example, may well have 
distributional implications. This can easily lead to mistrust and complicate things 
even further. It is fairly obvious that quantitative studies are not suited to shed more 
light on this issue. 
                                                        
2 I will only review the empirical studies which include the Netherlands and deal with the CPR 
problem and budget institutions. 
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The second blind spot concerns the way in which fiscal agreements can be made bind-
ing. This is a serious problem since it is unlikely that all actors will stick to the terms 
of the contract voluntarily. To my knowledge the only research conducted on this 
important question is by Marc Hallerberg and Jürgen von Hagen (Hallerberg 2001; 
Hallerberg/von Hagen 1999). These studies found that the stability of fiscal agree-
ments depends on the party system. Once again it is clear that qualitative methods are 
required to trace the strategic interactions between parties and ministers involved in 
the budget process. 
Finally, there is currently no agreement with regard to the effects of budget institu-
tions in general and fiscal agreements in particular. In addition, the impact of the lat-
ter on fiscal policies pursued has hardly been studied. In his pioneering study, Jürgen 
von Hagen (von Hagen 1992) uses rank correlations, non-parametric tests and simple 
regression analysis to test whether a “structural index” and a “long-term constraint” 
have an impact on public debt, net lending, and primary net lending.3 He finds that a 
structural index which includes a measure of the strength of the minister of finance 
generally has a strong and significant effect on fiscal variables. By contrast, his “long-
term constraint” which can be interpreted as a proxy for fiscal agreements, has hardly 
any significant impact on lending and public debt. 
In a more recent study for the Dutch Ministry of Finance (Hallerberg/Strauch/von 
Hagen 2001), Hallerberg and his collaborators find that various aspects of the strength 
of budget institutions have an impact on the development of real expenditures in fif-
teen EU countries. At the same time they do not find any important impact on the 
“fiscal stance” in their multivariate regression. 
De Haan and Sturm (De Haan/Sturm 1994) use von Hagen’s (von Hagen 1992) data 
in a pooled time-series regression of the EC countries between 1982 and 1992. The 
estimation results indicate that budgetary procedures are a relevant variable in explain-
ing cross-national differences in the development of public debt in GDP. However, 
they do not reveal any effects of the budgetary process on government expenditures. 
The same is true for other factors such as the ideological orientation of the govern-
ment or trade dependence. Unfortunately, the authors do not investigate the role of 
fiscal agreements in a more detailed manner. In a later study, De Haan, Moessen and 
Volkerink (De Haan/Moessen/Volkerink 1999) conclude again that budget institu-
tions matter but that the effects are quite small. This time De Haan and his collabora-
tors go into detail about the various aspects of budgetary institutions and find that 
“binding constraints” have a significant effect. 
Why are the estimated effects so small and uneven? While this may be attributed to 
differences in operationalization and “samples,” I suspect that there also might be 
                                                        
3 Primary net lending is net lending minus interest payments. 
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methodological reasons. First, it is impossible for quantitative studies to take the fiscal 
policy goals of the various governments into account. Second, in order to apply re-
gression analysis, complex and widely varying institutional arrangements have to be 
reduced to simple indices. This makes it difficult to interpret the results for practical 
purposes in a meaningful way. These rather simple methodological remarks are not 
meant to deny the value of quantitative analysis in political science or to belittle the 
achievements of von Hagen, De Haan and their collaborators. Instead the point here 
is to show that they must be complemented by qualitative case studies to extend our 
knowledge about budget institutions and fiscal agreements.4 
In this paper I use the combination of a case study and an intertemporal comparison 
to investigate Dutch fiscal policy in the last 25 years. This makes it possible to study 
the evolution of co-operation under the conditions of the CPR problem of public 
budgets. Furthermore, process tracing enables me to examine the way in which fiscal 
agreements are stabilized. With regard to the effects of fiscal contracts I first examine 
whether they made a difference in the yearly budget process. This method makes it 
possible to take the beliefs of actors and the contents of fiscal contracts into account. 
Thus I can compare collectively intended expenditures with fiscal outcomes. If actual 
spending is higher than originally intended, this indicates a CPR problem. In addition 
to process tracing, I compare a period without fiscal agreement to a phase with an 
effective fiscal contract. This allows me to control for several other factors and to ex-
amine whether fiscal contracts have an effect on aggregate spending. There are also 
drawbacks to this method, however. While it is possible to estimate the direction of 
the effects of fiscal agreements on public spending, I cannot exactly quantify them. 
Finally, one can object that no generalizable knowledge can be generated by means of 
a case study. It is certainly true that the findings produced with qualitative methods 
cannot be applied independent of time and space, but this does not preclude their 
being able to generate useful insights which can be applied in similar settings. After all, 
it is questionable whether the results of pooled time-series are strictly generalizable. In 
fact, the time-series analyzed are not random samples at all, but should also be re-
garded as the population. Nevertheless the insights gained can be practically and theo-
retically relevant. The next section deals with my analytical framework for the study of 
Dutch fiscal policy. 
                                                        
4 Actually, the authors have recognized this need and at times supplemented their regression 
analysis with short case studies. Furthermore, there are some detailed case studies for Ger-
many, Belgium, and Italy (Hallerberg 1999; von Hagen/Strauch 1999). 
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4 Analytical framework 
My explanatory framework draws on the literature on the CPR problem of public 
budgets and on elements of Scharpf and Mayntz’s actor-centered institutionalism 
(Mayntz/Scharpf 1995; Scharpf 1997). The most important independent variables are 
economic growth, the actor constellation, and the institutional framework. It is obvi-
ous that economic growth has a substantial impact on financial policy: The higher 
economic growth is, the lower public outlays and the higher revenues will be. Given 
that public budgeting always involves planning, future economic growth has to be 
estimated. Therefore what really matters to governments that want to achieve their 
budgetary targets is whether economic growth turns out to be above or below expec-
tations. This, of course, gives the government some leeway to conceal budgetary prob-
lems and thereby avoid awkward decisions. 
This brings us to the role of actors in budgetary decision-making. In the budgetary 
process certain actors have to decide on the public share in national product and how 
it should be distributed. With regard to the question of distribution, I presume that 
parliamentary parties and ministers are guided by their egoistic interests. Each actor 
strives for as big a share of the public budget as possible in order to endow his or her 
portfolio properly. At the same time, I presume that actors involved in financial policy 
have notions about an appropriate level of the public share in the economy. On the 
one hand, these are grand political-economic ideologies; on the other, they are hands-
on economic policy ideas. In reality, however, left or right ideologies as well the various 
schools of thought in academic economic policy are always interwoven with distribu-
tional interests. Nevertheless there seems to be a core in all these notions that deals 
with the impact of the size of the public sector on common welfare. Right-wing ide-
ologies hold that the public sector should be small because the market will maximize 
welfare. Leftist ideologies, by contrast, argue that the market responds to effective 
demand but does not necessarily meet people’s needs. With respect to schools of 
thought in economic policy we have to distinguish between Keynesian and neoclassi-
cal theories. The first approve a fiscal policy that stabilizes the economy through active 
demand management. By contrast, the latter call for a reduction of public outlays, 
taxes, and deficits in order to promote employment through lower labor costs and 
additional investment. All relevant theories consider some limit for the public sector 
to be necessary, because they want to maintain the free market. 
Given a sufficient number of actors, this combination of ideas about common welfare 
and egoistic interests results in a problem that has often been analyzed in the social 
sciences under the labels of the Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin 1968) or the com-
mon pool resource problem (Ostrom 1990). This actor constellation is hallmarked by 
the fact that public benefits can be privatized while the costs are widely spread. With 
respect to the budget this means that parliamentary parties and ministers involved in 
the budget process have a systematic incentive to endow their portfolios as well as 
possible and to disregard the impact on total spending. The reason is that the benefits 
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accrue at the clientele of the minister or her party, while the costs including the dead-
weight losses of taxation have to be borne by taxpayers and consumers of private 
goods. The price actually paid by the consumer of public goods is therefore much 
lower than their real costs. Therefore demand will also be higher than in a situation 
where the user has to pay the full price of the public benefit. Thus, the budget will end 
up being the sum of the egotistical demands of spending ministers, and it will inevita-
bly be bigger than any single minister or parliamentary party wishes. As a conse-
quence, taxes and deficits that cover spending will also be higher than collectively de-
sired, which means that such a budget will be inconsistent with common welfare. 
Note that the CPR problem is not one that results from irrational behavior. Rather, it 
is a dilemma that prevents perfectly rational actors from achieving their common 
goals. If the number of actors in the budget process increases it becomes therefore less 
likely that one minister or parliamentary party will make a sacrifice for the collective 
interest. Instead everyone hopes that the others will abstain from their claims for the 
sake of the common good, i.e. lower spending and taxation. Hence, it will become 
impossible to keep spending under control even if everybody agrees on the desired 
aggregate spending level. The common pool resource problem is the most fundamen-
tal dilemma of public budgeting. To make things worse, it extends over time, so that 
co-operative behavior is additionally complicated. Of course, one can object that 
budgeting does not take place in the midst of anarchy, but rather within the institu-
tional framework of a parliamentary democracy. While this certainly does not clear 
the common pool problem out of the way, it makes sense to ask whether and how 
institutions can help to solve it. 
Institutions can mitigate the common pool resource problem by creating roles and 
the necessary competencies in order to safeguard the collective interest vis-à-vis indi-
vidual interests. How does this work in a budget process? Usually three stages can be 
distinguished in the budget process: 
1. Budget initiative of the government. 
2. Debate and adoption of the budget bill by parliament. 
3. Execution of the budget by the government. 
The common pool resource problem looms primarily during the first two stages. In 
contrast the execution of the budget depends primarily on an efficient administration 
or once again on the institutional position of the minister of finance. During the 
budget initiative spending ministers hand their claims in. The prime minister has the 
responsibility to lead the government as a whole. Therefore, one cannot expect him to 
tolerate special interests of spending ministers. It will be easier for the prime minister 
to fulfill his duty if he has got the competencies to instruct his ministers or even to 
appoint and dismiss them. The minister of finance will be expected by the public as 
well as his colleagues to prevent increases in public expenditures which are inconsis-
tent with the collective interest. Legal or even constitutional prerogatives vis-à-vis 
spending ministers will help him to counter their claims. His position is strong if con-
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flicts over budgetary issues are solved in a cabinet committee where he and the prime 
minister dominate. Decision-making rules in the cabinet are also important. If una-
nimity is required, this constitutes a disadvantage for the minister of finance because 
spending ministers can insist on their claims. By contrast, the minister of finance has 
an institutional advantage if he alone possesses a veto in budgetary issues. 
When the budget bill is debated in parliament it is the government that has to prevent 
the parliamentary parties from making additional demands on the budget. The cabi-
net has a strong position in relation to parliament if members of parliament cannot 
submit their own bill and if only one house of parliament can decide on the budget 
bill. Furthermore, it is advantageous for the government if parliament can only pass 
or reject the bill but not amend it. If the prime minister and the minister of finance 
are in a strong position vis-à-vis the cabinet, and parliament is weak in relation to the 
government, then we should expect aggregate public spending to be in accordance 
with collective interest. What happens if the budget process is not hierarchically de-
signed? Then the CPR problem reappears or the politicians involved in the budget 
process manage to negotiate a fiscal contract. 
Following Elinor Ostrom (Ostrom 1990: 42–45) three requirements have to be met 
for a voluntary agreement to become a viable solution for a common pool resource 
problem: 
1. An agreement has to be negotiated that provides a set of rules which determine 
the level of public spending and the distribution of financial resources. 
2. The agreement has to be monitored by somebody. 
3. Finally, all actors have to commit themselves to the contract over an extended 
period of time. 
If these three conditions are fulfilled, contracts are at least theoretically a viable alter-
native to the hierarchical solution (e.g. strong minister of finance or prime minister) 
and can therefore overcome the common pool resource problem of public budgets. If 
there is no hierarchy and no contract, collectively unwanted increases in spending will 
be the consequence. In the next section I will examine whether the parliamentary sys-
tem in the Netherlands fosters a hierarchical or contractual solution to the CPR prob-
lem. 
5 The parliamentary system of the Netherlands 
In this section, I will assess the extent to which the features of the Dutch parliamen-
tary system favor or attenuate the common pool resource problem. First, I deal with 
the party system. Then I investigate the institutional position of the prime minister 
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and the minister of finance as well as the relation between cabinet and parliament in 
an international perspective. Finally, I show that fiscal contracts are favored by the 
procedures of government formation and that the party system promotes the stability 
of these agreements. 
What is the structure of the party system in the Netherlands? How many parties and 
ministers participate in government? The four major parties in the Netherlands are 
the Christian democratic CDA, the social democratic PvdA, the conservative VVD, 
and the left-leaning liberal D’66. The party system has two cleavages. Christians are 
represented by the CDA, while all other parties can be considered secular. The VVD 
represents the interests of the higher-income brackets and homeowners. Therefore it 
takes a position on the far right on the socio-economic axis. The CDA is the party for 
religious people of all strata and therefore in the middle. The D’66 was founded as a 
progressive party that aims to reform the political system. It is a liberal party that has 
long been in a close alliance with the social democrats. Hence, it can be placed to the 
left of the CDA, while the PvdA is clearly the most left-wing of the four major parties. 
Tables 1 and 2 show that the two cleavages in Dutch society and the strictly propor-
tional electoral system combine to produce a comparatively high number of effective 
parties in parliament and government. 
In view of the facts presented in Tables 1 and 2, it seems likely that the common pool 
problem is of relevance in the Dutch case even if one considers that the number of 
ministers in the cabinet is clearly below the international average. Is the budget proc-
ess hierarchically designed? 
The main problem in comparing the strength of institutional positions is the question 
of how to define institutions. On the one hand, it is impossible to rely on formal and 
written rules only. Consider the case of Great Britain and New Zealand, which do not 
have a written constitution. Nevertheless, conventions make their prime ministers 
extremely powerful. On the other hand, when one sets out to assess the actual power 
of the prime minister or minister of finance, the term “institution” becomes meaning-
less. Since there is no good solution to this dilemma in my opinion, I will not base any 
strong conclusions on this analysis. 
Table 3 shows that the position of the Dutch prime minister vis-à-vis the cabinet is 
rather weak in comparative perspective. Nine of the fourteen prime ministers are in a 
stronger position. The Dutch premier can formally neither instruct nor dismiss indi-
vidual ministers. Hence, he is quite weak when compared for example with the Ger-
man chancellor or the Anglo-Saxon prime ministers. The institutional position of the 
minister of finance is laid down in simple legislation. Important budgetary issues are 
decided in an inner cabinet where the minister of finance has considerable influence. 
The official quorum for decisions in the cabinet is the majority rule, but the prime 
minister’s vote decides in case of a tie. Table 4 shows, on the one hand, that the British 
chancellor of the exchequer as well as the German minister of finance are in a much 
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Table 1 
Number of effective parties in parliament, 1970–2002 
Period Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark 
1970–1979 2.5 2.2 5.7 2.4 5.0 
1980–1989 2.4 2.4 7.2 2.1 5.2 
1990–1999 2.4 3.2 8.0 2.5 4.6 
2000–2002 2.5 3.4 5.6 2.7 4.6 
Period Germany Great Britain Ireland Italy Japan 
1970–1979 2.3 2.2 2.5 3.4 2.8 
1980–1989 2.6 2.1 2.6 3.9 2.8 
1990–1999 2.8 2.2 3.2 5.9 3.3 
2000–2002 2.9 2.1 3.0 5.7 3.1 
Period Netherlands New Zealand Norway Sweden OECD-14 
1970–1979 5.6 1.9 3.5 3.3 3.2 
1980–1989 3.8 2.0 3.1 3.4 3.3 
1990–1999 4.6 2.5 4.2 3.5 3.8 
2000–2002 5.1 3.5 4.8 4.3 3.8 
Notes: The number of effective parties (N) is computed as follows: N = 1 /∑si2 in which si is the share of 
seats of the i-th party. 
Sources: Data for 1970–2001 are from Hendrik Zorn, election results for 2002 were taken from IFES




Number of parties in government and type of government, 1970–2002 
Period Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark 
1970–1979 1.7  1.0  m 4.3  o, m 1.0  m 1.1  m 
1980–1989 1.3 1.7 2.2  o 1.0  m 3.2  m 
1990–1999 1.3  2.0 4.3 1.0 2.6  m 
2000–2002 2.0 2.0 6.0  o 1.0 2.0  m 
Period Germany Great Britain Ireland Italy Japan 
1970–1979 2.0 1.0  m 1.3 2.7  o, m 1.0  m 
1980–1989 2.0 1.0 1.5  m 4.6  m 1.3  m, o 
1990–1999 2.0 1.0 2.3  m 4.6  m 2.2  m, o 
2000–2002 2.0 1.0 1.8 6.3  o 3.0  o 
Period Netherlands New Zealand Norway Sweden OECD-14 
1970–1979 4.3 o 1.0 1.4  m 1.8  m 1.8 
1980–1989 2.2 o 1.0 1.6  m 1.4  m 1.9 
1990–1999 2.5 o 1.3  m 1.6  m 2.3  m 2.2 
2000–2002 3.0 o 2.0  m 1.9  m 1.0  m 2.5 
Notes: In this table “m” indicates a minority government and “o” an oversized coalition. Caretaker gov-
ernments are not accounted for because definitions vary between countries. 
Sources: The figures from the number of parties in government during the period 1970–1979 are from 
Lane /McKay /Newton (1997: 126–130), the other data are from Woldendorp /Keman/Budge (2000: Chap-
ters 4 to 49), Kaiser (2002), Archiv der Gegenwart, various internet sources, and own computations. 
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better position. On the other hand, it is also clear that the position of the minister of 
finance in Norway is even weaker. It therefore seems safe to conclude that the Dutch 
minister of finance has comparatively few hierarchical competencies vis-à-vis his col-
leagues. Table 5 displays indicators for the relation between the cabinet and parlia-
ment in the budget process in my sample of parliamentary democracies. 
Dutch members of parliament cannot submit their own budget bill, and the Eerste 
Kamer5 has practically no say in budgetary issues, but the Tweede Kamer can amend 
the budget bill as it sees fit. There is, however, the unwritten rule that amendments 
have to include a proposal on how to finance it. Even though parliament has even 
more extensive powers in Belgium and Norway, it is clear that the Tweede Kamer is in 
a strong position in comparison to the Bundestag or the lower house in the Anglo- 
Saxon democracies. Although the parliaments in Belgium and Norway have even 
more influence in the budget process, it is clear that Dutch parliament is strong in  
 
                                                        
5 The Eerste Kamer is the upper house, the Tweede Kamer is the lower house of parliament. 
Table 3 













New Zealand strong 
Norway weak 
Sweden intermediate 
Note: This table provides an overview of the prime minister’s posi-
tion vis-à-vis other ministers. If the prime minister can instruct as 
well as appoint and dismiss her ministers she has a strong position. 
In those cases where the prime minister can only instruct or appoint /
dismiss his ministers he is in an intermediate position. Otherwise he 
or she is in a weak position. 
Source: Own diagram on the basis of a literature review. 
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comparative perspective. In short, the Netherlands are characterized by a combination 
of a pronounced common pool problem and a collegial design of the budget process. 
Therefore the question arises as to whether the parliamentary system of the Nether-
lands is conducive to the conclusion of binding fiscal contracts.  
Table 4 
Position of minister of finance in 14 parliamentary democracies 
Country Legal basis Decision in case of conflict Mode of decision 
Australia Ordinary law Prime minister Cabinet decisions are confidential, 
dominant position of prime 
minister 
Austria Federal  
constitution 
Cabinet Unanimous decision 
Belgium Ordinary law and 
standing orders 
Coalition committee Practically delegated to the high 
council of finance 
Canada Ordinary law Ministers don’t know details 
of the budget proposal 




Decisions are made in  
the economic committee 
chaired by the minister  
of finance 
Unanimous decision 
Germany Ordinary law and 
standing orders  
of the government 
Negotiations between spend-
ing minister and minister of 
finance plus chancellor 
Minister of finance can only be 
outvoted by a majority including 
the chancellor 
Great Britain Conventions  
and standing  
orders 
Confidential, chief secretary 
dominates spending side 
Chancellor of the exchequer and 
prime minister dictate revenue 
side and thereby the total amount 
of spending 
Ireland Ordinary law and 
standing orders 
Confidential, no information Cabinet decisions are confidential, 
dominant position of prime 
minister 
Italy Ordinary law Cabinet No exceptional position of 
minister of finance 
Japan Ordinary law No conflict in cabinet Unanimous 
Netherlands Ordinary law Prime minister can mediate, 
core cabinet 
Majority, in case of a tie the vote 
of the prime minister decides 
New Zealand Ordinary law Until 1996 prime minister, 
thereafter coalition committee
Confidential, dominant position 
of prime minister 
Norway Ordinary law Minister of finance  
collects claims of spending 
ministers 
Unanimous, government submits 
a proposal to parliament that 
makes the final decision 
Sweden Ordinary law and 
standing orders 
Spending ministers  
receive little information  
on the budget proposal 
In practice the prime minister and 
minister of finance on the basis of 
multi-annual plans 
Sources: Own diagram on the basis of information from homepages of ministries of finance, inquiries at
ministries of finance, and a literature review. 
Table 5     Parliament and budget 
Country Australia Belgium Denmark Germany Great Britain Ireland Italy 
Which houses  
of parliament 
decide? 
House of Representatives 
& Senate 
De Kamer Folketing Bundestag House of Commons Dail Eireann Camera dei Deputati & 
Senato della Repub-
blica 
Budget bill from 
members of 
parliament? 
No Yes No No No No No 
Amendments? No Yes Yes Yes In practice none No Yes 
Limitations? Parliament can only  
pass or reject the bill 
No limita-
tion 
No limitation Proposals that increase spending  
or reduce revenues can only be de-
bated if they include a plan on how 
to fund the resulting gap. Federal 
government can veto amendments. 
The veto cannot be overruled by 
parliament. If parliament and cabi-
net cannot agree the government 
can continue on the basis of emer-
gency budgets. 
In practice parlia-
ment can only pass 
or reject the bill. 
Officially it can re-
duce spending. 
Parliament can only 
reject or pass the 
bill. 
Parliament cannot in-
crease the deficit 
Country Japan Canada Netherlands New Zealand Norway Austria Sweden 
Which houses  
of parliament 
decide? 




House of Representatives Storting Nationalrat Riksdag 
Budget bill from 
members of 
parliament? 
No No No No Government only 
makes a proposal 
and parliament 
decides 
Theoretically yes, if 
federal government 
fails to submit the 
budget proposal in 
time 
Yes 
Amendments? Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Limitations? There is no clear demarca-
tion between an amend-
ment and a budget bill  
of parliament. A conflict 
between cabinet and 
parliament can therefore 
lead to stalemate. 
Parliament 
can only 






ments have  
to include a 
proposal for 
funding 
Until 1996 parliament could only 
pass or reject the bill. Ever since the 
government can veto amendments. 
Parliament cannot overrule these 
amendments. This can result in a 
stalemate. 
No limitation No limitation No limitation 
Sources: Homepages of parliaments, national codes of law, information from civil servants in Belgium, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and Austria as well as a literature re-
view (Hallerberg /Strauch /von Hagen 2001; Sturm 1989; von Hagen/Harden 1994). 
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In fact the Dutch parliamentary system has many features that favor fiscal agreements. 
In the Netherlands, societal cleavages result in a high number of parties, which makes 
coalition governments and compromises necessary. In the course of the last century 
procedures of government formation have been developed (Andeweg/Van der Tak/
Dittrich 1980) that foster compromises through the extensive use of “neutral” expert 
knowledge. The most important advisory bodies in the area of financial policy are the 
Central Planning Bureau (CPB), the Central Economic Commission (CEC), and the 
Study Group on the Budget Margin. Especially since the late 1960s compromises on 
financial policy have been laid down in ever more detailed coalition agreements. Min-
isters and parliamentary parties have to commit themselves to these agreements, 
which have developed more and more into full-fledged government programs (Bov-
end’Eert 1988; Van Raalte/Bovend’Eert/Kummeling 1991). Over time, government 
formations turned into a central policy-making arena (Timmermans 1998). Hence, 
supplying fiscal contracts does not seem to pose a major problem. 
Though the minister of finance has only limited hierarchical competencies vis-à-vis 
his colleagues, he has still sufficient information on all financial issues to monitor the 
implementation of a fiscal contract. Furthermore, a close look at Table 2 reveals that 
the Netherlands belong to the small group of nations that do not have minority gov-
ernments but do tend to have oversized coalitions. The high number of parties in gov-
ernment is therefore not a direct consequence of the electoral system but rather a re-
sult of a desire for broad majorities. A party’s chance of participating in a governing 
coalition depends therefore less on its share of the vote than on its relationship to 
other parties. Under these conditions it does not pay for a party to break an agree-
ment with another party, because it loses its reputation as a reliable coalition partner, 
which in turn reduces its chances to participate in future coalitions. Given that the 
share of votes is not the only determinant of the chance to participate in government, 
electoral competition is eased somewhat. This reduces the incentive for parties to turn 
populist and break an agreement just before the elections in order to increase their 
share of the vote. This should strengthen commitment to the fiscal contract.1 To what 
extent can the budgetary performance of the Netherlands be traced to the common 
pool problem and fiscal contracts? 
 
                                                        
1 The argument presented here is a variation of a theme discovered by Hillebrand and Irwin 
(1999); Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) even argue that countries with multi-party systems 
(but without a dominant party) deliberately choose the fiscal contracts as a solution for the 
common pool problem. 
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6 The financial policy of the Van Agt, Lubbers and Kok governments 
In this section I analyze the financial policy of all cabinets in the last twenty-five years 
in a theoretically informed manner. In each case, I first evaluate the importance of the 
election for government formation. Second, I analyze the process of government for-
mation and the coalition agreement. Third, I sketch financial policy during the term 
and finally I check whether the cabinet has reached its own financial targets. Before I 
turn to the various cabinets, however, some remarks have to be made about the 
change from Keynesian to supply-side financial policy. 
In the 1960s the Netherlands introduced Keynesian fiscal policy in order to stabilize 
effective demand and to ensure full employment. Labor costs were not a big issue at 
the time. There were two ideas behind the so-called Zijlstra norm, which was intro-
duced in 1961. First, central government’s budget was supposed to act as an automatic 
stabilizer for the economy. The second goal of Minister of Finance Zijlstra was more 
political in nature. The norm was intended to force parliament to appreciate the bene-
fit of additional outlays and the resulting costs in terms of increased taxation (Dia-
mond 1977; Kertzman 1972/73). During the 1960s the norm worked satisfactorily. 
Public finances were in good shape, and at the same time the Dutch experienced full 
employment. In the recession of the mid-seventies, however, Keynesian fiscal policy 
proved to be inadequate. The consequences were increasing unemployment and a 
steep rise in public outlays. Minister of Finance Wim Duisenberg tried to counteract 
both problems with his “one-percent norm,” which aimed to reduce the increase of 
taxation in national income to one percentage point per year. At the same time, the 
Netherlands’ Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis established the so-called “labor 
cost theory” through the use of its new simulation program VINTAF II. This heralded 
the end of the Keynesian era in the Netherlands and led to a new view of the role of 
financial policy in relation to the labor market. The major actors in financial policy 
now believed that unemployment could only be reduced if the growth of the tax bur-
den was curbed and the deficit was at least kept stable. In this perspective cuts in pub-
lic spending served common welfare and the central question was whether it would 
prove possible to implement them against the resistance of special interests. The Den 
Uyl government only partly managed to implement the measures associated with the 
“one-percent norm.” 
The elections of 1977 were an impressive victory for the social democrats. They in-
creased their share of the vote considerably and became the biggest parliamentary 
party in the Tweede Kamer in Dutch history up to that point. In the government for-
mation that followed, the social democrats experienced for the first time the so-called 
“trauma of defeat in victory.” The government formation lasted 208 days and in the 
end, a center-right coalition of Christian democrats and conservatives was sworn in 
(Andeweg et al. 1978). The coalition agreement mirrored the economic ideas of VIN-
TAF II and consequently aimed at dampening the rise in the tax burden in order to  
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reduce structural unemployment. To this end the new Van Agt government wanted to 
continue the “one-percent” policy. The part of the coalition agreement that dealt with 
financial policy was quite vague and was based on far too optimistic assumptions re-
garding economic growth. Real growth during the term averaged only 1.3 percent but 
in the first three years between 1978 and 1980, it was at 1.9 percent. The cabinet was 
therefore under pressure to substantiate its plans. The result was a paper known as 
“Blueprint ‘81”. The purpose of the new plan was to prevent the deficit and the tax 
burden from becoming a larger share of national income, thus stabilizing the public 
share in the economy. Despite new forecasts by the CPB, “Blueprint ‘81” stuck to far 
too optimistic assumptions about economic growth and contained no specific plans 
for cuts in public outlays. Hard decisions were postponed until decisions were made 
on the 1979 budget. 
The consequences of this rather vague declaration of intent were soon felt. Growth 
was lower than assumed by the government and consequently even more savings were 
necessary in order to reach the targets. At the same time, “Blueprint ‘81” provided no 
leverage for the minister of finance since it contained no specific measures he could 
demand from the spending ministers. Thus, “Blueprint ‘81” remained a vague plan 
even after the negotiations for the 1979 budget (Toirkens 1988). Spending ministers 
skillfully avoided clear-cut decisions by way of non-binding accords and short-term 
measures that did nothing to solve the problem. These measures only postponed hard 
decisions. If the cabinet could not agree, it decided, for example, to cut compensation 
to the various ministries for the increase in prices. On paper the ministries therefore 
had less money to spend. In reality, however, no decision was made where the cuts 
should be implemented. To the spending ministers this meant a further adjournment. 
Another measure was to declare a temporary moratorium on spending. This stopped 
the rise in expenditures and the deficit only temporarily because claims were once 
again voiced after the end of the moratorium. Ministers were, however, not generally 
opposed to savings. They only objected to savings that pertained to their own budgets. 
The attitude of the minister of education Païs (VVD) was a typical case in point. In a 
whole series of cabinet meetings he delivered extensive economic speeches on the ne-
cessity of cuts in all areas of public spending – except education, of course. Since the 
conduct of his colleagues was hardly more cooperative, Minister of Finance Andries-
sen (CDA) achieved very little in the almost uninterrupted budgetary negotiations of 
these years. The main reason for the steep increase in outlays was the indexation of 
social benefits and salaries in the public sector to the development of private sector 
wages. The latter were in turn indexed to prices. As a consequence a dangerous wage-
price spiral developed during the second oil-crisis. Nevertheless, the minister of social 
affairs was not prepared to abolish indexation unilaterally because he wanted an ami-
cable solution with the unions (Visser/Hemerijck 1998). Finally, Andriessen resigned 
because he was defeated in the conflicts with the minister of social affairs. In a state-
ment to the press the minister of finance judged the cabinet’s financial policy harshly 
by Dutch standards: “The cabinet’s policy of austerity and moderation is less than it 
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appears to be. It is not enough of anything and this is exactly what this country is con-
tinuously suffering from.” 2 
His successor Van der Stee was no more successful. In order to hide the whole extent 
of budgetary problems, the cabinet started to fund outlays outside the regular budget. 
Moreover, the Netherlands’s own huge natural gas reserves and the Dutch state had 
substantial ownership in the gas producing industry. When energy prices skyrocketed 
and profits increased quickly, the government could finance an increasing share of its 
growing budget from gas revenues without resorting to additional taxation. In spite of 
these revenues and the use of accounting gimmicks, the cabinet Van Agt I did not 
reach a single one of its own financial targets at the end of its term. 
In the 1981 elections the social democratic party lost a substantial share (Brants/Kok/
van Praag 1981) of its vote, but without them no government could be formed. The 
election result ensured that the governing coalition could not continue. Finally, an over-
sized coalition of Christian democrats, social democrats, and liberals was formed. Within 
this center-left-left coalition, considerable disagreements on economic policy persis-
ted especially between the CDA and PvdA. While Christian democrats wanted to reduce 
the budget deficit, the social democrats insisted on a generous public works program. 
The coalition agreement did not settle this issue but rather concealed it by the use of 
vague formulations. After only one month the cabinet collapsed for the first time be-
cause of conflicts over the interpretation of the financial part of the coalition agree-
ment. This time, however, the Queen appointed new informateurs3 who managed to 
bridge the gap. In the months that followed the economic situation deteriorated even 
further. Finally, there was almost no money left for the social democrats’ public works 
program. In May 1982 the cabinet fell over the resulting tensions. Dutch public finances 
were obviously in a state of crisis. Expenditures increased unchecked, the deficit passed 
10 percent of national income in spite of the rising tax burden. This devastating pic-
ture was still sugarcoated by the substantial but extremely unreliable gas revenues. 
Minister of Finance Van der Stee reacted to this crisis by asking the Study Group on 
the Budget Margin to investigate the controllability of public finances and to generate 
recommendations. The expert committee at the ministry of finance regarded the pris-
oner’s dilemma of the budget as the key problem for the controllability of public fi-
nances. The Study Group recommended concluding multi-annual fiscal contracts 
during government formation. According to the experts, coalition agreements should 
be based on a cautious scenario and include not only simple targets for the tax burden 
and the deficit but also tangible savings and precisely defined measures. This was to 
help the minister of finance assert his claims. Furthermore, the advisors alerted the 
leading politicians of the upcoming government to the perils of programs with unlim-
                                                        
2 Translation by the author, cited from the Dutch CD-rom version of Keesings Historical Ar-
chive (Keesings Historisch Archief, 2001). 
3 Informateurs are appointed by the Queen during government formations. 
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ited appropriations which are especially difficult to control since they are not subject 
to the scrutiny of the budgetary process. Unlimited appropriations are common prac-
tice in social insurance, for example. Finally, they advised against indexation of social 
benefits and salaries in the public sector (Tweede Kamer 1982–1983). 
In the 1982 elections, the social democrats gained votes and became the biggest party, 
but this time the election result permitted a coalition of CDA and VVD. Given the 
salience of economic policy at the beginning of the eighties and the extreme position 
of the social democrats on this issue, they were not seriously taken into consideration 
during government formation. By contrast, the liberals were asked twice whether they 
were willing to enter government in spite of the fact that CDA and VVD held a major-
ity in the Tweede Kamer. Finally, a center-right coalition with fourteen ministers un-
der Prime Minister Lubbers was formed. Although once again the relation between 
the parties had been a decisive factor for government formation, it emerged clearly 
that the social democrat’s polarization strategy had created blocs of left- and right-wing 
parties after the strategy had failed. In the long run, this development gave increasing 
weight to electoral fortunes. 
The cabinet also embraced the view of the Central Economic Commission, which held 
that the reduction of the deficit at a stable tax burden has to be regarded as a prerequi-
site for investments and a lasting improvement of the labor market. In order to 
achieve the necessary savings, it adopted a considerable share of the recommendations 
of the Study Group in its coalition agreement. Hence, the agreement not only defined 
targets for the tax burden and steps for the reduction of the deficit but also substanti-
ated savings in particular policy areas which were deemed necessary to reach the tar-
gets during the term. It was agreed to abolish indexation of social benefits to wages in 
the private sector in order to dampen the development of the so-called “price compo-
nent” of social expenditures. Furthermore, the coalition agreement specified struc-
tural reforms in social insurance which would cut the number of beneficiaries. The 
assumptions about economic growth on which the simulations of the coalition 
agreement were based proved to be realistic. Therefore it seems justified to consider 
this a full-blown fiscal contract. This agreement had a substantial impact on the 
budget process. The minister of finance insisted on the provisions of the contract and 
was supported by the prime minister most of the time. Although the minister of fi-
nance did not always prevail, he succeeded often enough to cause spending ministers 
to complain about the strict terms of the coalition agreement. After all, the cabinet 
managed to achieve the volume of economies agreed in the coalition agreement. In 
spite of the recovery more savings had to be found in order to reach the targets for the 
tax burden and the deficit. Once again, this involved painstaking negotiations. Never-
theless it can be maintained that the fiscal contract helped to mitigate the common 
pool resource problem. Where deviations from the financial part of the coalition 
agreement can be detected, they involved such aspects as the way spending cuts were 
arrived at and how the money saved was actually used, but they did involve expendi-
ture overruns. Cuts were mainly achieved by the manipulation of the “price compo-
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nent” of public expenditures. Measures which cut the “volume-component” i.e. the 
number of beneficiaries were not implemented. Finally, it turned out to be difficult 
for the cabinet to meet the timetable for the reduction of the deficit because the sav-
ings were mainly realized in social insurance and had therefore no direct effect on the 
financial balance. At the same time, cabinet wanted to reduce the tax burden in order 
to facilitate wage moderation. As a result, the first Lubbers cabinet reduced the tax 
burden quickly although the coalition agreement foresaw only stabilization. 
The parties considered their collaboration to be successful and decided to continue if 
the election results permitted. Such a statement declaring the party with which one 
intends to form a coalition is a rather unusual step in Dutch politics. Obviously, this 
made the upcoming elections even more important (Van der Eijk/Irwin 1986) and 
thereby endangered the stability of coalition agreements. The coalition parties won a 
majority in the Tweede Kamer again since the losses of the VVD were made up by the 
gains of the CDA. Since the election results determined the composition of the future 
cabinet, government formation was mainly about policy. Generally, the parties 
wanted to continue financial policy of their first term. To this end they specified once 
again budgetary targets for the whole term, which amounted to a stabilization of the 
tax burden and a stepwise reduction of the deficit. In addition, the coalition agree-
ment laid down strict budgetary rules which stated that additional tax revenues could 
not be used to fund spending overruns (Regeerakkoord Tweede Kabinet-Lubbers 1986). 
The assumptions about economic growth, however, turned out to be far too pessimis-
tic. Therefore, the second Lubbers cabinet had to deal with entirely different problems 
than the first. Programs that operated on the basis of unlimited appropriations cre-
ated large spending overruns. At the same time, the booming economy in the second 
half of the eighties produced substantial additional tax revenues. Politicians were 
therefore tempted to break budgetary rules and use windfall revenues to fund perma-
nent overruns. In this situation it proved to be decisive that the declining popularity 
of the cabinet caused the parliamentary parties to worry increasingly about votes. The 
VVD feared that voters would hold it responsible for the austerity policies of the gov-
ernment and that the CDA could then switch to the social democrats after the elec-
tions. Christian democrats were also hardly prepared to cut back on programs which 
benefited their supporters. Both parties strived to increase their share of the vote by 
way of gifts to their voters at the expense of the other party and budgetary discipline. 
Thus, Prime Minister Lubbers was forced to compromise if he wanted his government 
to stay in power. Budgetary rules were shelved so as to finance the claims of both par-
ties, and cyclical tax revenues were used to fund the resulting additional outlays. In a 
time of sharp competition between the two governing parties, Minister of Finance 
Ruding was as powerless as Andriessen during the first Van Agt cabinet. Finally, the 
populist attempts of the VVD to increase its share of the vote led to the fall of the sec-
ond Lubbers government (NRC Handelsblad, 1 May 1989: 1). 
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Although the structural balance of the budget worsened considerably during its term, 
Lubbers II reached all its fiscal targets due to the booming economy. Furthermore, 
consolidation was only achieved by way of reducing the price of public benefits. By 
contrast, the volume of public benefits, i.e. the number of beneficiaries, decreased at 
best cyclically. The development of the disability pension which threatened to pass the 
threshold of one million claimants is especially telling in this respect. These budgetary 
sins became a burden for the following cabinet. 
The fall of the government made early new elections in 1989 necessary, which brought 
the Netherlands once again closer to consensual democracy (Narud/Irwin 1994; 
Wolinetz 1990). During the campaign the CDA did not commit itself to any coalition 
after the elections. Under their new leader Wim Kok, the social democrats pursued a 
new strategy. They adopted a more consensual attitude towards the other parties and 
thereby lent themselves to the Christian democrats as a potential coalition partner. 
The leadership of the PvdA was even prepared to accept vote losses in return for a 
better chance to participate in office (Hillebrand/Irwin 1999: 124–125). The VVD 
hoped to win enough votes to revitalize the coalition with the Christian democrats. 
Although the election results permitted such a coalition and the social democrats had 
lost votes, a center-left coalition consisting of CDA and PvdA was formed. The most 
important effect of the elections on the party composition of the government was the 
fact that the biggest party participated in cabinet. Therefore one could expect the par-
ties to strictly adhere to the provisions of the coalition agreement. 
The fourteen ministers of the cabinet Lubbers III and the parliamentary parties com-
mitted themselves to the coalition agreement and thereby to a fiscal contract that in-
cluded targets for the tax burden and the deficit. As in earlier terms the government 
aimed at stabilizing the share of taxes in national income and reducing the deficit each 
year. At the same time, the cabinet wanted to restore indexation of public benefits and 
wages to pay increases in the private sector. Structural problems in social insurance 
were to be dealt with through a strategy that was applied to the volume component of 
public spending. Next to some substantiated cuts the coalition agreement foresaw 
mainly preventive measures in the area of disability pensions to achieve this goal. In 
sharp contrast to the previous term, the assumptions about economic growth used in 
the coalition period proved to be far too optimistic. Economic growth during the 
cabinet’s term averaged only 2.1 percent, and in the first three years between 1991 and 
1993 it amounted to a meager 1.7 percent. 
Hence, the coalition encountered financial difficulties. Instead of “reaping the fruits of 
the reforms” as Lubbers had indicated during the election campaign, his new Minister 
of Finance Wim Kok had to pinch and scrape. As had been the case during Van Agt I, 
the coalition agreement had to be supplemented by a so-called “mid-term review” in 
order to reach the targets in spite of the slump (Tweede Kamer 1990–1991). The PvdA  
 
 
26 MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/2 
lost dramatically at the polls. Nevertheless the social democratic minister of finance 
had to stick to the provisions of the coalition agreement because otherwise the social 
democrats would have lost their reputation as a coalition partner and suffered a severe 
defeat in the elections. The “mid-term review” foresaw cuts in all areas of the public 
sector including disability pensions. It did not, however, specify how the number of 
disability pensioners could be reduced. The reason was that this program was more 
important to the PvdA than to the Christian democrats. In countless negotiations 
during which the cabinet was always on the verge of breakdown, it proved possible to 
assert the volume policy in social insurance. The continuous procyclical austerity 
policies led the government to doubt whether it made sense to keep the targets. To-
wards the end of the term, it was finally agreed to drop the target marks for 1994. In-
stead the cabinet gradually adopted a policy which backed the so-called “activating” 
labor market policy by way of a reduction of the tax wedge for low-income workers. 
All the same, the targets of the coalition agreement were met to an astonishing degree. 
As a result of the problems brought about by the policy of rigid targets in changing 
economic circumstances, the minister of finance charged the Study Group on the 
Budget Margin to draw lessons from these difficulties and to advise on possible solu-
tions. In their report the experts recommended a new fiscal norm which included 
elements of the “Zijlstra norm” of the 1960s. The central tenets of the norm were: 
First, conservative assumptions about economic growth (“cautious scenario”) and 
second a fixed, cyclically independent upper limit for real public spending (Kraan 
2001; Van Ewijck / Reininga / ter Rele 1999). These rules effectively separated the 
spending side from the revenue side of the budget. It was hoped that the new norm 
would prevent procyclical financial policies in the future and avoid continuous nego-
tiations over cutbacks outside the regular budget cycle. Once again, a report of the 
Study Group on the Budget Margin had an enormous impact on financial policy of 
the following cabinet. 
The difficulties of the third Lubbers government had lasting consequences for future 
financial policy by discrediting the policy of fixed targets. Furthermore, the political 
struggles around the disability pensions caused a landslide in the following elections. 
Both coalition parties lost heavily. Due to infighting the CDA lost even more votes 
than the PvdA which made the social democrats by a small margin the largest actor in 
a party system dominated by four parties of almost equal size. Each combination of at 
least three parties had a majority in the Tweede Kamer (Hippe/Lucardie/Voerman 
1995). After a government formation that lasted a hundred days a new cabinet led by 
Wim Kok was sworn in. It was based on a coalition of PvdA, D’66, and VVD. In fact 
this was the first government since 1917 without a Christian party. Many political 
observers expected the coalition of two left-wing parties (PvdA, D’66) and one right-
wing party (VVD) to have a short lifetime. The new Minister of Finance Gerrit Zalm, 
however, argued that the cabinet would be very stable because no party could afford 
to defect from the coalition agreement. Any party doing so would be ignored during 
the next government formation (Het Financieele Dagblad, 21 Sept. 1994: 15). 
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The coalition agreement largely followed the recommendations of the Study Group. 
The fiscal contract, the so-called “Zalm norm,” was based on cautious assumptions 
about economic growth which proved to be very conservative indeed. Real economic 
growth during the term averaged 3.4 percent. In the three years between 1996 and 
1998 growth was on average as high as 3.7 percent. For each budget year a ceiling for 
real spending was laid down. In addition a number of spending cuts were proposed in 
order to ensure that real public spending would decrease during the government’s term. 
If economic growth turned out higher than expected, additional tax revenues would 
have to be spent on the reduction of the deficit or the tax burden. If economic growth 
proved to be lower than expected, outlays could still be financed as long as the yearly 
limit of the deficit was not exceeded. With this coalition agreement the new cabinet 
wanted to decrease public spending in a smooth way in order to reduce the tax wedge 
on low-wage labor and create new jobs. Moreover, the government wanted to reduce 
the deficit in order to lower interest payments and to meet the Maastricht criteria. 
The strong recovery in the years from 1995 to 1998 and the Zalm norm made for a 
smooth budget process. Once a year there were separate negotiations on the spending 
and the revenue side of the budget rather than continuous struggles for cutbacks. The 
spending limits laid down in the coalition agreement could easily be kept. The impact 
of the fiscal contract was also evident in the way the financial surplus created by eco-
nomic growth was spent. 
The VVD rejected the social democrat’s claims for additional spending with reference 
to the Zalm norm. In accordance with the preferences of the VVD, windfall gains pro-
voked by the Zalm norm in combination with the booming economy were utilized to 
reduce the deficit. High economic growth, however, also creates margins on the 
spending side of the budget because of decreasing unemployment. The social democ-
rats could therefore spend more money than originally foreseen on health care with-
out violating the terms of the coalition agreement. Furthermore, the PvdA asserted 
targeted tax reductions for low-income workers which also benefited their supporters. 
In the end, the first Kok government achieved all its budget targets. Unemployment 
was falling and at the same time employment grew rapidly. The Zalm norm proved to 
be a success for the coalition. 
Given that the incumbent cabinet was as successful as it was popular, a large share of 
the electorate as well as politicians from the governing parties wanted to continue the 
coalition. The Democrats’66 was the only party that could not profit from the popu-
larity of the government. Since the two other parties regarded D’66 as necessary for 
the functioning of the government, however, they did not oppose D’66. This was their 
strategy for avoiding an election disaster and a resignation of the liberals from gov-
ernment. Although PvdA and VVD finally won a majority in the Tweede Kamer, the 
old coalition including the liberals was continued. It is fairly obvious that the elections 
had at best a limited impact on this government formation (De Boer et al. 1999). 
28 MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/2 
Minister of Finance Zalm successfully asserted his norm as the basis for the financial 
part of the coalition agreement (Tweede Kamer 1997–1998). In the first half of the 
term the “cautious scenario” estimated by the Central Planning Bureau once again 
proved to be very conservative. Thereafter, however, it turned out to be rather realistic. 
Initially, the coalition continued the successful budget policy of its first term. Ironi-
cally, full employment disclosed a constructional flaw of the norm which in turn led 
to internal strife in the coalition. The reason was the asymmetric impact of the Zalm 
norm which continuously produced “unexpected” additional revenues and lower than 
budgeted outlays. Additional revenues soon turned out to be very high indeed. In 
contrast, “unexpected” savings were rather modest, because at full employment 
spending for the unemployed could hardly decline any further. This meant that no 
additional funds could be raised for financially suffering policy areas such as health 
care which were of great importance to the social democrats and the liberals. This led 
to considerable tensions because the VVD was more interested in a high budget sur-
plus and tax reductions. PvdA and D’66 even threatened to shelve the Zalm norm. 
Minister of Finance Zalm and his party stated unmistakably that they were not pre-
pared to abolish the norm, and that any attempt to do so would result in a fall of the 
cabinet. The PvdA put the screws on the minister of finance to exploit all the financial 
resources available under the terms of the coalition agreement. Prime Minister Kok 
wanted to sustain his cabinet and therefore tolerated the behavior of his parliamentary 
party, but at the same time supported the maintenance of the Zalm norm. In the sec-
ond half of the government’s term this problem vanished as the budget surplus disap-
peared when the current recession set in. During the period of declining economic 
activity, the advantages of the Zalm norm were reconfirmed. In spite of reduced tax 
revenues, the targets of the coalition agreement were reached without hectic cutbacks. 
7 Conclusion 
What conclusions can be drawn from this comparison? First, in the analysis of the 
coalition talks of the cabinets Lubbers I and Kok I, I showed how co-operation can 
evolve under the conditions of the common pool resource problem. The Dutch politi-
cal landscape – its multi-party system, its lack of a strong prime minister or minister 
of finance, and the strong position of parliament vis-à-vis cabinet – makes a fiscal 
contract a prerequisite to a financial policy in accordance with the common interest. 
At the same time, the political system is very conducive to fiscal contracts: It was the 
analyses of the Central Economic Commission on the basis of the CPB’s macroeco-
nomic model VINTAF II that led to the insight that cuts in public spending were nec-
essary to restore full employment. Hence, cuts in public spending were a common good 
and therefore the only question was how to defend it against special interests. The 
Study Group on the Budget Margin gained considerable influence on the course of 
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financial policy of the Netherlands at two junctures. Its first report on institutional 
aspects of the budget process in 1983 allowed parties to state their intentions in an 
appropriate and exhaustive fiscal contract. This was a decisive step towards a new 
course in financial policy. A decade later the Study Group paved the way for the Zalm 
norm, which has shaped Dutch economic and social policies in the recent years. Since 
the advisors coped with the “production problem” and the politicians dealt with the 
“distributional problem,” the two dimensions were effectively separated. The in-
volvement of “neutral” expertise thus helped to overcome the negotiators’ dilemma 
and to foster the creation of fiscal contracts. 
Moreover, the multi-party system also stabilized the coalition agreement because the 
chance to participate in government depended more on the relationship between the 
parties than the share of votes a party won at the polls. If the party’s chance of partici-
pating in government depends very much on its relations to other parties, then each 
party will be anxious not to violate the terms of the coalition agreement. In fact, a 
party that openly breaks a fiscal contract would run the risk of being excluded from 
government formation even though it may have won additional seats in the elections. 
If votes gain importance, however, parties will tend to break an agreement in order to 
enhance their chances at the polls. This can be shown with the help of Table 6. 
The years from 1988 to 1990 and 1996 to 1998 were periods of high economic growth. 
Given that tax revenues were buoyant, politicians perceived fiscal contracts as restric-
tive in both time spans. In the first period budget discipline slipped in spite of the 
conservative ideological orientation of the second Lubbers cabinet because each party 
tried to please its constituency. Each coalition party tried to emphasize its own 
strengths at the expense of the others. Competition for votes thereby led to higher 
spending in violation of the terms of the coalition agreement. Finally, the cabinet fell. 
In contrast, the cabinet Kok I, which was only one possible coalition among others, 
had comparatively little problems with budgetary discipline. As Gerrit Zalm correctly 
pointed out, no party could afford to break the coalition agreement. Consequently, 
the share of government outlays in GDP declined somewhat more quickly than during 
the reference period. This hypothesis has, of course, implications from the point of 
view of democratic theory since coalition agreements are only stable as long as politi-
cal competition is reduced. In fact, Dutch voters unsatisfied with their lack of influ-
ence on the composition of government have in the past turned to parties like D’66, 
which in 1967 promised a more “democratic” political system with a directly elected 
prime minister (Andeweg/Irwin 2002). Also the success of Pim Fortuyn can be traced 
to his populist critique of the “political cartel in The Hague” (Pennings/Keman 2002). 
Another comparison of the periods from 1978–80 and 1991–93 shows that fiscal con-
tracts had a moderating effect on public spending. In both phases economic growth 
and other explanatory variables were almost equal or yielded results that run counter to 
my hypotheses. Because the election of 1977 had little impact on the composition of the 
government, everybody could be expected to adhere to the coalition agreement. Poli-  
Table 6     Dutch government terms in comparison, 1978–2002 
 Van Agt I 
(1978–1981) 













Targets reached? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public outlays  
in % of GDP 
+7.7 (78–80: +5.8) +2.2 −3.1 −2.6 (88–90: −3.9) −1.8 (91–93: +0.5) −4.3 (96–98: −4.4) −1.5 
Economic growth 
% of GDP +1.3 (78–80: +1.9) −1.2 +2.7 +3.2 (88–90: +3.8) +2.1 (91–93: +1.7) +3.4 (96–98: +3.7) +2.4 
Assumed/real growth Blueprint 1981 
3% / −0.3% NI 
No information 
given 
3% / 3.7% WT 2.3% / 3.1 NI 2.25% / 1.95% NI 2% / 3.4% GDP 2.25% / 2.4% GDP
Actors and actor constellation 
Ideol. orientation Center-right Center-left-left Center-right Center-right Center-left Left-left-right Left-left-right 
Economic policy idea Lower taxes for 
more jobs 
Disagreement Deficit reduction 
or more jobs 
Lower taxes for  
more jobs 
Lower taxes for  
more jobs 
Lower taxes for  
more jobs 
Lower taxes for 
more jobs 
CPR problem? Yes Disagreement Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ministers /parties 16/2 15/3 14/2 14/2 14/3 14/3 14/3 
Fiscal contracts 
Type Declaration of intent Fixed targets Zalm norm 
Relationship between 
share of votes and 
composition of 
government 
Weak association Weak association Weak association 
but increasing  
Relatively strong 
association, declara-
tion before election 
regarding party with 
which coalition is 
planned 
Weak association Weak association Weak association
Level of spending/
specific cuts? 
Hardly any details, 
changing targets 
No specific deal Specific details on 
both issues 
Specific details on 
both issues 
Specific details on 
both issues 
Fixed real spending /
specific cuts 
Fixed real spend-
ing / specific cuts 
NI = national income     WT = world trade 
Source: Own diagram, economic data from OECD (2002). 
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ticians had gained the insight that the growth of public expenditures had to be curbed 
in order to reduce unemployment. What lacked, however, was technical support to 
generate an effective fiscal contract. This only became available through the Study 
Group’s report on the controllability of public finances. During the third Lubbers 
cabinet, however, parties were tied to an effective fiscal contract. The result was, that 
the share of public outlays in GDP increased by 5.8 percentage points in the years 
between 1978 and 1980 while the reference period in the nineties witnessed only a 
minor rise of 0.5 percentage points. This demonstrates that if one controls for a range 
of other factors, fiscal contracts helped to avoid unwanted public spending. It is there-
fore possible to explain a substantial part of the empirical puzzle which provided the 
starting point of this paper: the development of public spending in the Netherlands, in 
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